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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2-2 (3) (j)Utah Code Annotated and Rule 3(a) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for jurisdiction in this 
Court in this action, which is an appeal from a judgment granted on 
all issues and as to all parties, on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or 
in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment in the Third 
Judicial District Court Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that the statute of frauds bars Appellant's, Larry 
Clayton, recovery on his contract with Appellee, Kip Eardley. 
Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are given no 
deference but are reviewed for correctness. Malone v. Parker, 826 
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) . 
2. Whether the trial court erred in applying the 
"exclusively referable standard" to Clayton's part performance of 
the contract when the parties agreed that an oral contract existed. 
Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are given no 
deference but are reviewed for correctness. Malone v. Parker, 826 
1 
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). 
3• Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that Clayton's part performance of the contract was 
not exclusively referable to the contract but that it was equally 
referable to a series of six contracts, each having a duration of 
one year. Standard of review: Trial court's legal conclusions are 
given no deference but are reviewed for correctness. Malone v. 
Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Eardley and granting Eardley his taxable costs, if 
any, and whether there are genuine issues as to material facts 
precluding summary judgment. Standard of review: Trial court's 
legal conclusions are granted no deference but the Appeals Court 
reviews are for correctness. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993), Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 
1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 
1991). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Standard of review: In 
reviewing cases of equity, this Court rejects the trial court's 
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findings only if evidence clearly preponderates against those 
findings or there is misapplication of the law. Ryan v. Earl, 618 
P.2d 54 (Utah 1980) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an action commenced by Appellant, 
Larry Clayton, to enforce an oral contract with the Appellee, Kip 
Eardley, for the purchase of tickets to the Utah Jazz basketball 
games. Larry Clayton sued Kip Eardley in the District Court asking 
the District Court to determine that Defendant had breached the 
contract with the Plaintiff fixing damages in an amount to be 
determined and for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendant 
from selling, giving away, disbursing or dividing or in any other 
manner using Mr. Clayton's one-third share of the tickets and for 
declaratory relief declaring that a valid and binding contract 
between the parties existed and that Mr. Clayton was entitled one-
third of all Utah Jazz basketball tickets for all coming years of 
the Utah Jazz basketball season. The Defendant filed a Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. The lower 
court granted Kip Eardley's Motion for Summary Judgment, and this 
appeal by Mr. Clayton followed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Larry Clayton, seeks a reversal of the trial 
court's Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee, Kip 
Eardley and a reversal of the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT ON APPEAL 
Beginning in approximately 1989, the Appellee, Kip 
Eardley (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Eardley"), and a Mike 
Marcus, shared season tickets for two to the Utah Jazz basketball 
games, which had originally been purchased in Mr. Eardley's name in 
an agreement with Eardley and the Utah Jazz. (R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 
76) 
Mr. Eardley was experiencing financial difficulties in 
keeping the tickets and paying for one-half of them with Mike 
Marcus, and in order for Mr. Eardley to keep the season tickets, 
Mr. Eardley offered and Plaintiff accepted, the right to purchase 
one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets. (R. 2, 25) 
Beginning in approximately 1989, Mr. Eardley offered one-
third of his regular and post-season Utah Jazz play-off tickets to 
Mr. Clayton. Mr. Clayton accepted that offer and entered into an 
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oral agreement with Mr. Eardley that for each and every year Mr. 
Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off 
tickets thereof from Mr. Eardley. (R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76) 
On an annual basis, from 1989 through 1994, Mr. Clayton, Mr. 
Eardley and Mr. Marcus met prior to the beginning of each 
basketball season and divided up the tickets amongst them, one-
third each. A similar meeting would be held before the play-off 
games and the play-off tickets would be divided in a mutually 
agreeable manner, one-third to each of them. Mr. Clayton and Mr. 
Marcus would pay their one-third share directly to Mr. Eardley or 
the Utah Jazz Ticket Office. (R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76) 
This oral contract entered into between Mr. Clayton and 
Mr. Eardley provided that Mr. Clayton would have the right, each 
and every year in the future, to purchase from Mr. Eardley one-
third of the regular season and one-third of the play-off tickets. 
This agreement and understanding was restated by Mr. Clayton, Mr. 
Eardley and Mr. Marcus each year at the above-referenced meetings 
when the tickets were divided. (R. 2, 3, 25, 75 and 76) On or 
about January 1995, Mr. Eardley offered Mr. Clayton $500.00 for Mr. 
Clayton's rights in the contract to purchase one-third of the 
tickets from Mr. Eardley. Mr. Clayton rejected that offer and told 
Mr. Eardley that he was not interested in selling his one-third 
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interest in the tickets. (R. 3) 
During the 1995 Utah Jazz play-off season, Mr. Clayton 
sent a check for $405.00 to the Jazz office as his one-third 
purchase price of the Jazz play-off tickets, however, the Jazz 
Ticket Office returned Mr. Clayton's check at Mr. Eardley's 
request. Thereafter, Mr. Eardley refused to honor the contract by 
refusing to divide with Mr. Clayton his one-third of the Jazz 
regular season and play-off tickets. (R. 3 and 4) 
During the period of time of the oral contract between 
Mr. Clayton and Mr. Eardley, the Mr. Eardley at times either sold 
or gave away part of his (Mr. Eardley's) one-third tickets and Mr. 
Clayton believed that unless enjoined from doing so, Mr. Eardley 
would either sell, give away or otherwise prevent Mr. Clayton from 
acquiring his one-third of the season tickets for the coming years 
of the Utah Jazz basketball. (R. 4 and 5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In the pleadings and affidavits below, the parties 
agreed that an oral contract existed for the sale of Jazz tickets 
by Mr. Eardley to Mr. Clayton and show that they agreed on the 
terms of said contract and that the contract had been performed by 
the parties over a number of years. Where the existence of an oral 
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contract is established by admissions of the parties, the 
requirement that the acts of part performance must be exclusively 
referable to the oral contract is satisfied. The trial court erred 
in concluding as a matter of law that said requirement had not been 
met and that the statute of frauds therefore barred Mr. Clayton's 
recovery. 
2. Even if the requirement that part performance of the 
contract by Mr. Clayton must be exclusively referable to the oral 
contract is not met by an admitted oral contract between the 
parties, Mr. Clayton raised material questions of fact as to 
whether his conduct met the standard so as to preclude summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley. 
3. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Clayton's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction because he met all the 
requirements of Rule 65(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT IS ESTABLISHED BY 
ADMISSION OF THE PARTIES, THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE ACTS OF 
PART PERFORMANCE MUST BE EXCLUSIVELY REFERABLE TO THE ORAL 
CONTRACT IS SATISFIED. 
The statute of frauds, 25-5-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
requires certain agreements to be in writing: 
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The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement is in writing, signed by the party 
to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year from the 
making of the agreement. 
However, § 25-5-8 allows part performance to remove an 
oral contract from the statute in certain circumstances: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance thereof. 
This Court has set forth the standard of sufficient part 
performance in the case of Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 
1993) as follows: (1) the oral contract and its terms must be clear 
and definite; (2) the acts done in performance of the contract must 
be equally clear and definite; and (3) such acts must be in 
reliance on the contract. 
In this case, the first two requirements are established 
by the parties' pleadings and affidavits. 
(A) The oral contract is clear and definite. 
Mr. Eardley's own affidavit filed in support of his 
opposition to Mr. Clayton's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
establishes the existence of an oral contract and its terms and 
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conditions. (R. 24 and 25) In paragraph 4 of that affidavit, Mr. 
Eardley states, "In approximately 1989, Affiant began offering to 
sell one-third of Affiant's season tickets to Larry Clayton 
(Clayton) on a yearly basis." Paragraph 5 states,"Clayton accepted 
Affiant's offers each year for the years 1989 through 1994-95 
season". And in paragraph 6 it states, "After the 1994-95 regular 
season, Affiant decided not to offer to sell any more of the 
Affiant's tickets to Clayton." 
In addition to Mr. Eardley's admissions as to the 
existence of the contract as set forth above, the trial court in 
its Findings of Fact (R. 75 and 76) states in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 
and 5 as follows: Paragraph 2, "Beginning in approximately 1989 
Eardley offered one-third of his regular season Jazz basketball 
tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets to Plaintiff Larry 
Clayton." Paragraph 3, "From 1989 through the 1994-95 season, 
Clayton and Eardley orally agreed that Clayton would purchase one-
third of the regular season and play-off tickets." Paragraph 4, 
"On an annual basis from 1989 to 1994, Clayton, Eardley and Marcus 
met prior to the beginning of each basketball season and divided up 
the tickets amongst them, one-third each. A similar meeting was 
held before the play-off games and the play-off tickets were 
divided amongst them, one-third each. Clayton and Marcus paid 
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their one-third share either directly to Eardley or to the Utah 
Jazz Ticket Office." Paragraph 5, "At the meetings where the 
regular season and play-off tickets were divided, Eardley, Clayton 
and Marcus discussed the agreements and agreed that the arrangement 
was mutually agreeable and satisfactory and that the one-third 
purchase by each would continue on an on-going basis from year to 
year." These Findings of Fact are not challenged by Mr. Eardley on 
appeal and show that an oral contract was entered into and its 
terms. 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, paragraphs 3 through 9 
(R. 2 and 3) set forth Plaintiff's allegation as to the existence 
of the contract. These allegations are not denied by the Defendant 
and, in fact, the trial court as set forth above, found in its 
Findings of Fact that a contract existed and that the terms thereof 
were agreed upon by the parties. Thus, an oral contract existed 
with clear and definite terms agreed upon. 
(B) The acts done in performance of the contract must 
be clear and definite. 
The acts of the parties in the part performance of the 
contract were indeed clear and definite. The same sections of Mr. 
Eardley's affidavit and the court's Findings of Fact as set forth 
above, show that the acts were clear and definite. For example, 
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they show that Eardley offered, and Clayton accepted, a one-third 
interest in the on-going season tickets, yearly meetings were held 
before each season began with the parties dividing the tickets one-
third to each, with payment made by Clayton to Eardley or directly 
to the Utah Jazz Ticket Office. It is clear from the undisputed 
facts as set forth above and the admissions of Mr. Eardley that the 
acts done in performance of the contract were clear and definite. 
Therefore, the second prong of the test is met. 
(C) The acts must be exclusively referable to the oral 
contract. 
The last prong of the test is met because the parties 
both admit that an oral contract existed. Paragraphs 3 through 9 
of Mr. Clayton's Verified Complaint (R. 2 and 3), paragraphs 4, 5 
and 6 of the June 7, 1995, Eardley affidavit (R. 25) and paragraphs 
2, 3, 4 and 5 of the court's Findings of Fact (R. 75 and 76) show 
that Clayton alleged, Eardley admitted, and the trial court found 
that an oral contract existed between the parties. 
This Court, in In Re: Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 (Utah 
1954) acknowledged the exclusively referable rule stating: 
It is true, as appellant argues, that the acts 
of part performance must be exclusively 
referable to the contract in that the 
possession of the party seeking specific 
performance and the improvements made by him 
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must be reasonably explicable only on the 
postulate that a contract exists. p. 281. 
However, the Court goes on to state, citing Corbin on Contracts, 
Section 430, that where the existence of the oral contract is 
established by admission of the party resisting performance, that 
the requirement that the acts of part performance must be 
exclusively referable to the oral contract is satisfied. Id. p. 
281. 
More recently, this Court in the case of Martin v. 
Scholl, supra, has reaffirmed the ruling and holding in In Re: 
Roth's Estate. In Martin, this Court stated, "Where the contract 
is admitted or strong independent acts which prove the contract 
exists, the requirement of exclusively referable acts has been 
relaxed." Id. p. 277. The Court then went on to cite the ruling 
and holding in the In Re: Roth's Estate case and quoted Roth's as 
follows: 
Where the existence of the oral contract is 
established by an admission of the party 
resisting specific performance or by competent 
evidence independent of the acts of part 
performance, the requirement that the acts of 
part performance must be exclusively referable 
to the oral contract is satisfied. p. 278. 
Mr. Eardley admits to the existence of the contract in 
his June 7, 1995, affidavit in paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof as set 
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forth above. Furthermore, the trial court found, unchallenged by 
Mr. Eardley, in its Findings of Fact paragraph 3 as set forth above 
that, "From 1989 through 1994-95 season, Clayton and Eardley orally 
agreed that Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular season 
and play-off season tickets." 
Utah law is clear regarding this issue on appeal. Where, 
as here, the existence of an oral contract is admitted by the party 
resisting its enforcement, as Mr. Eardley is, the requirement that 
Mr. Clayton's acts be "exclusively referable" to the contract is, 
in fact, satisfied. 
However, the lower court committed reversible error when 
in spite of the existence of a clear oral contract, in its 
Conclusions of Law, in paragraph 3 and 4 thereof, it held that Mr. 
Clayton's alleged partial performance of the contract is not 
exclusively referable to the contract and that the exception to the 
statute of frauds of partial performance is not available to Mr. 
Clayton since the contact alleged by the Plaintiff is not 
exclusively referable to a single contract with a term of more than 
one year. The trial court ignored the admitted fact and conclusion 
that an oral contract existed and went on to still require 
"exclusively referable acts" by Mr. Clayton. 
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The trial court based its decision to grant summary 
judgment to Mr. Eardley based upon the above-referenced Conclusions 
of Law that the ''exclusively referable" test was not met. The case 
law cited above, however, and the facts of this case as shown, show 
that, in fact, such test was met. 
Therefore, because the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Eardley based on its erroneous conclusion that 
the standard had not been met, when in fact, it had, and because 
the other two prongs of the test for taking an oral contract out of 
the statute of frauds were met, summary judgment was improper and 
should be reversed. 
II. MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACTS EXIST AS TO CLAYTON'S PART 
PERFORMANCE SO AS TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Even if the requirement of "exclusively referable" to the 
contract was not satisfied by the admitted existence of the oral 
contract by Mr. Eardley, material questions of fact exist that 
preclude summary judgment in Mr. Eardley's favor. On appeal from 
summary judgment, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the Motion. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1993) . And summary judgment is appropriate only when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure 56(c), Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1993) . 
The facts, when viewed most favorably to Mr. Clayton, 
show that his performance evidence the existence of the contract 
and was not reasonably explainable on any other ground, or at 
least, a material question of fact remains on that issue. 
For example, Mr. Clayton's Verified Complaint in 
paragraphs 1 through 9 show only one contract with Mr. Eardley, 
that yearly meetings were held to divide the tickets, that Mr. 
Clayton paid Mr. Eardley or the Utah Jazz Ticket Office for the 
tickets and that Mr. Clayton refused an offer in 1995 by Mr. 
Eardley to purchase Mr. Clayton's right to a one-third interest in 
the tickets. (R. 2, 3 and 4) Indeed, Mr. Eardley in his affidavit 
of June 7, 1995, does not deny these sworn allegations, but in 
fact, admits to an offer and acceptance. No other explanation of 
Mr. Clayton's acts are advanced by Mr. Eardley, nor how his actions 
are part of anything but their oral contract. 
It even appears from the record that, in fact, no 
material question of fact exists that Mr. Clayton's actions were 
entirely referable to the oral contract in question and not some 
other agreement or venture between the parties. For example, Mr. 
Eardley does not set forth in any affidavit any other reason why 
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Mr. Clayton would meet with Mr. Eardley, divide up and purchase the 
Jazz season tickets. 
This Court in Martin v. Scholl, supra, states that the 
performance must be in some degree evidential of the existence of 
the contract not readily explainable on any other ground. p. 275. 
The Court then goes on to agree with Professor Corbin in his 
Treatise on Contracts, 2 Corbin on Contracts, Section 442, that the 
more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less 
stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts. Id. p. 
278. 
Therefore, because Mr. Clayton's acts, viewing the 
evidence most favorably to him, cannot be explained on any other 
ground than the oral contract in question, which contract as 
earlier shown was clear and definite as to its terms, there 
remains, at a minimum, a question of fact that precluded summary 
judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the summary judgment in favor of Mr. Eardley and reinstate 
the case. 
III. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF MR. CLAYTON'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Based on his Verified Complaint, Mr. Clayton moved the 
court for a preliminary injunction. In response, Mr. Eardley 
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submitted an affidavit dated June 7, 1995. (R. 24 and 25) This 
affidavit did not refute the sworn allegations of Clayton's 
Complaint with respect to the grounds for a preliminary injunction. 
In paragraphs 14 through 18 of the Verified Complaint, Clayton 
alleged that given Mr. Eardley's past conduct of giving, selling or 
disposing of his own one-third of the Jazz season tickets, that 
unless an injunction were issued, Eardley might dispose of 
Clayton's one-third shares before the court could resolve the 
matter. 
The trial court made no Findings of Fact regarding these 
allegations and entered no Conclusions of Law with respect thereto. 
Rather, the court appears to have denied the preliminary injunction 
only because it granted summary judgment to Eardley on the statute 
of frauds claim. In paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law, the 
court states, "As a result of the dismissal of the action, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief by virtue of his Complaint or 
his Motion for Preliminary Injunction." (R. 78) 
Therefore, if the Court reverses the trial court and 
reinstates the case, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
should be granted since the Plaintiff in his Verified Complaint 
alleged compliance with Rule 65 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, and the allegations were not contested by any affidavit 
or sworn statement of Mr. Eardley. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Clayton seeks reversal of the trial court's granting 
of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Eardely and the denial of his 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The statute of frauds does not 
bar the relief sought by Mr. Clayton because the parties admit the 
existence of an oral contract and, therefore, the "exclusively 
referable" requirement needed in order to take the contract out of 
the statute of frauds, was met, contrary to the Findings by the 
trial court. Further, genuine issues of material fact were raised 
that preclude summary judgment. 
DATED this / U day of January, 1996. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
J, 'SsVL^ 
Ferre 
Cttorneys for P la in t i f f /Appel lant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed postage prepaid this /& day of January, 
1996, to the following: 
Dennis Poole 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
/^>t^. _ 
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ADDENDUM TO B R I E F OF APPELLANT 
1 . F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law. 
2 . Judgmen t . 
3. Verified Complaint. 
4. Affidavit of Kip Eardley, June 7, 1995. 
5. Statute of Frauds 
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DENNIS K. POOLE [2625] 
ANDREA NUFFER [6623] 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY CLAYTON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
- vs. 
Case No. 950903536 
KIP EARDLEY : 
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
on August 28, 1995. Plaintiff was present and was represented by 
L. Mark Ferre of and for Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe. Defendant 
was represented by Dennis K. Poole of and for Dennis K. Poole & 
Associates, P.C. The Court having considered Plaintiff's Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, the memoranda in support 
Third .Judicial District 
SEP t 5 1995 
Deputy Clerk 
EARDLEY.FOF (AN) 
NE001-06436 
0 0 0 0 7 4 
and in opposition thereof, the affidavit of Kip Eardley, and having 
received and considered the argument of counsel, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following factual allegations, taken from Plaintiff's 
Complaint, were presumed to be true for purposes of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss: 
1. Prior to 1989, Defendant Kip Eardley ("Eardley11) and Mike 
Marcus ("Marcus") shared season tickets for two, to the Utah Jazz 
basketball games, which tickets had originally been purchased in 
Eardley's name through an agreement between Eardley and the Utah 
Jazz. 
2. Beginning in approximately 1989, Eardley offered one-
third of his regular season Jazz basketball tickets and one-third 
of the play-off tickets to Plaintiff Larry Clayton ("Clayton"). 
3. From 1989 through the 1994-95 season, Clayton and Eardley 
orally agreed that Clayton would purchase one-third of the regular 
season and play-off tickets. 
4. On an annual basis from 1989 to 1994, Clayton, Eardley 
and Marcus met prior to the beginning of each basketball season and 
divided up the tickets amongst them, one-third each. A similar 
meeting was held before the play-off games and the play-off tickets 
were divided amongst them, one-third each. Clayton and Marcus paid 
EARDLEY.FOF (AN) 0 
NE001-06436 
000075 
their one-third share either directly to Eardley or to the Utah 
Jazz ticket office. 
5. At the meetings where the regular season and play-off 
tickets were divided, Eardley, Clayton and Marcus discussed the 
arrangements and agreed that the arrangement was mutually agreeable 
and satisfactory and that the one-third purchase by each would 
continue on an on-going basis from year to year. 
The following facts, while not included in Plaintiff's 
Complaint, were supported by affidavits and were not disputed by 
Plaintiff: 
6. No written contract was entered into between Eardley and 
Clayton^and no other written memoranda executed by Eardley existed 
regarding the disposition of one-third of Eardley's Utah Jazz 
tickets. 
7. The Utah Jazz sold season tickets to Eardley on an annual 
basis, and they reserved the right to refuse to sell season tickets 
to anyone. 
8. Other than the Verified Complaint, Clayton offered no 
affidavits in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction or 
in opposition to Eardley's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is no genuine issue of material fact existing 
relative to the issues before the Court. 
2. Plaintiff alleges the existence of an oral contract which 
can not be performed within one (1) year. No written agreement or 
memoranda signed by Defendant Eardley exists which evidences the 
agreement. 
3. Although Plaintiff alleges partial performance of the 
contract, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is not exclusively 
referable to the contract alleged by Plaintiff. 
4. The evidence amply demonstrates that the conduct alleged 
by Plaintiff is equally referable to a series of six contracts each 
having a duration of one year as it is to a single contract for a 
term of more than one year. 
5. The Statute of Frauds is a rule of substantive law which 
prohibits enforcement of a contract not in writing which is not to 
be performed in one year. 
6. The exception to the Statute of Frauds of partial 
performance is not available to Plaintiff since the conduct alleged 
by Plaintiff is not exclusively referable to a single contract for 
a term of more than one year. 
7. Defendant is entitled to judgment no cause of action in 
accordance with his Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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8. As a result of the dismissal of the action, Plaintiff is 
not entitled to relief by virtue of his Complaint or his Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. 
9. Defendant is entitled to his taxable costs, if any. 
DATED this 15 day of ^(I>QJ04*Jk^ , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
L. Mark Ferre, Esq. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
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DENNIS K. POOLE [2625] 
ANDREA NUFFER [6623] 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY CLAYTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIP EARDLEY 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 950903536 
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
August 28, 1995. Plaintiff was present and was represented by L. 
Mark Ferre of and for Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe. Defendant was 
represented by Dennis K. Poole of and for Dennis K. Poole & 
Associates, P.C. The court having reviewed the file, having heard 
the arguments of counsel, having entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and for good cause appearing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is 
hereby denied. 
2. Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment against 
Plaintiff no cause of action on all claims. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT entered this 1^3 day of 
1995 
EARDLEY.ORD (AN) 
NE001-06436 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING ____> 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT in Case No. 
950903536 to the following: 
L. Mark Ferre, Esq. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah 
this day of September, 1995. 
Susan C. Held 
EARDLEY.ORD (AN) 
NE001-06436 
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L. Mark Ferre, # 1065 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801)486-1112 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LARRY CLAYTON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KIP EARDLEY, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 
Judge: 
-oooOooo-
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for causes of action against the Defendant alleges 
as follows: 
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Salt Lake County and the 
contract sued upon herein was entered into and was to be performed in Salt Lake County and, 
therefore, jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court. 
2. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that, prior to approximately 
1989, the Defendant and Mike Marcus shared season tickets for two to the Utah Jazz basketball 
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games, which had originally been purchased in Defendant's name through an agreement between 
the Defendant and the Utah Jazz. 
3. Beginning approximately 1989, the Defendant offered one-third of the regular 
season Jazz basketball tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets to the Plaintiff. Defendant was 
experiencing financial difficulties in keeping the tickets and paying for one-half of them with Mike 
Marcus and, therefore, in order for Defendant to be able to keep the season tickets, Defendant offered 
and Plaintiff accepted the right to purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets. 
4. From and after 1989, the Plaintiff and Defendant have had an oral agreement 
that each and every year Plaintiff would purchase one-third of the regular season and play-off tickets, 
Mike Marcus would purchase one-third thereof and Defendant would purchase one-third thereof. 
5. Each and every year from and after 1989, the Plaintiff, the Defendant and 
Mike Marcus would meet prior to the beginning of each basketball season and divide up the tickets 
amongst them, one-third each in a mutually agreeable fashion. A similar meeting would be held 
before the play-off games and the play-off tickets were divided in a mutually agreeable manner, one-
third to each of them. Plaintiff and Mike Marcus would pay their one-third share either directly to 
Defendant or to the Utah Jazz ticket office. 
6. At these meetings where the regular season and play-off tickets were divided, 
the Plaintiff and Defendant and Mike Marcus discussed the arrangements and agreed that the 
arrangement was mutually agreeable and satisfactory and that the one-third purchase by each would 
continue on an on-going basis from year to year. 
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7. The contract entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant provided 
that the Plaintiff would have the right, each and every year in the future, to purchase from the 
Defendant one-third of the regular season tickets and one-third of the play-off tickets. This 
agreement and understanding was restated by the Plaintiff, Defendant and Mike Marcus each year 
at the above-referenced meetings when the tickets were divided. 
8. In each of the years above referenced up through the present, the Plaintiff 
would make payment for his one-third of the basketball tickets either to the Utah Jazz office or to 
Mr. Eardley. 
9. On or about January 1995, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff $500.00 for his 
rights in the contract to purchase one-third of the tickets as above referenced. The Plaintiff rejected 
that offer and told the Defendant that he was not interested in selling his one-third interest. 
10. During the 1994-1995 basketball season, the Utah Jazz became eligible to play 
in the play-offs. Pursuant to the above-referenced contract and agreement of the parties, the Plaintiff 
on March 14, 1995, sent a check for $405.00 to the Utah Jazz office as the Plaintiffs one-third 
purchase price of the Jazz play-off tickets. 
11. Shortly thereafter, the Utah Jazz ticket office returned the Plaintiffs check 
with a note indicating that he should call Kip Eardley, giving the phone number of Mr. Eardley. 
12. The Plaintiff attempted repeatedly to contact Mr. Eardley to discuss why his 
check was returned and when he could expect his one-third of the basketball play-off tickets. 
13. Despite repeated demands for his one-third of the play-off tickets, the 
Defendant failed and refused to give him his one-third of the tickets. The Plaintiff has also tendered 
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to the Defendant his one-third share of the cost of the play-off tickets for the 1994-1995 season but 
that tender has been refused by the Defendant. 
14. During the period of time of the contract between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, the Defendant has at times either sold or given away part of the Defendant's one-third 
share of the tickets. Plaintiff believes that unless enjoined from doing so, the Defendant will either 
sell, give away or otherwise prevent the Plaintiff from acquiring his one-third of the season tickets 
for the coming years of the Utah Jazz basketball. 
15. Based upon Defendant's past history of giving away, selling or otherwise 
disbursing of his personal tickets, and the Defendant's refusal to cooperate in obtaining Plaintiffs 
one-third of the play-off tickets, the Plaintiff believes that the Defendant, unless enjoined from doing 
so, will obtain all of the Utah Jazz basketball tickets for the upcoming season and for all further 
seasons and give, sell or otherwise disburse said tickets in a manner such that the Plaintiff will not 
be able to acquire and use them. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if he is unable to obtain his 
one-third of the tickets because there are no other comparable season ticket seats available for 
purchase, and the Utah Jazz ticket office will not sell the tickets to Plaintiff. 
16. The 1995-1996 Jazz season tickets will go on sale in the next few days and 
will be available for Mr. Eardley to pick up at the Utah Jazz office. Unless restrained from doing 
so, Plaintiff believes that the Defendant will take all of the 1995-1996 season tickets and not give 
one-third of them to the Plaintiff but will use them in a manner such that Plaintiff will not be able 
to acquire or use them. 
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17. Despite repeated demands, Defendant has failed and refused to honor the 
terms of the contract as set forth hereinabove and Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
18. The injury to Plaintiff of not being able to obtain one-third of these season 
tickets out weighs any damage an injunction prohibiting Defendant from keeping them from the 
Plaintiff, would cause the Defendant. 
19. A preliminary injunction against the Defendant would not be adverse to the 
public interest and there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
20. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 19 set 
forth hereinabove. 
21. Defendant has breached the contract with the Plaintiff and as a result of 
Defendant's breach of the contract, the Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at 
trial. 
22. The Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for said damages and is entitled to 
judgment therefor. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
23. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 22 set 
forth hereinabove. 
24. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65A, Plaintiff is entitled to a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendant from selling, giving away, disbursing or dividing or 
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in any other manner, using Plaintiffs one-third of the 1995-1996 Utah Jazz basketball tickets and 
all later year's basketball tickets including play-off tickets. Such preliminary injunction should 
continue until such time as the Court has ruled on the rights of the parties and ordered judgment 
accordingly. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
25. The Plaintiff incorporates herein by referenced paragraphs 1 through 24 set 
forth hereinabove. 
26. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Utah Code Annotated 78-33-
1 et sefl., Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment declaring that there exists a valid and binding 
contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the terms of which are set forth hereinabove, that 
Plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the Utah Jazz basketball tickets, both for the regular season and 
play-off games for all coming years of the Utah Jazz basketball season, that the Defendant has 
breached said contract and for an order of this Court directing and ordering the Defendant divide 
with the Plaintiff one-third of all said tickets for all forthcoming seasons. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For damages against the Defendant for breach of contract as may be proved 
at trial. 
2. For a preliminary injunction preventing the Defendant from selling, using, 
giving away or in any other manner, disposing Plaintiffs one-third of the Utah Jazz basketball 
tickets for all coming seasons. 
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3. For a declaratory judgment declaring that a valid and binding contract exists 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant under which the Plaintiff is entitled to one-third of all Jazz 
basketball tickets, both regular season and play-off for all coming seasons. 
4. For costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action. 
5. For all such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this J2_ day of Ufa 1995. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
).ss 
LARRY CLAYTON, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and has read the foregoing 
Verified Complaint and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge 
and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (~? day of JL/4^ . 1995. 
/</?/« '£fr??C4 
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Notary Public J 
MARY KAY WILLIAMS 1 
21M Sou* 1300 East #5201 
Soft Uko City, Utah M1Q6 ! 
My Commission Expires \ 
^ Mvthft. 19f9 | 
L 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
L. M j^rk Ferre 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
603980 c 
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ANDREA NUFFER [6623] 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telefax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY CLAYTON, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIP EARDLEY 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No. 950903536 
KIP EARDLEY : JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KIP EARDLEY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. In approximately 1984 or 19 85,«Affiant purchased season 
tickets with the Utah Jazz basketball franchise in Affiant's name 
only. 
2. It has been Affiant's experience that after purchasing 
season tickets from the Utah Jazz, Affiant was offered season 
tickets by the Utah Jazz in subsequent years, which tickets gave 
Affiant substantially similar or better seating positions than the 
previous year(s). 
EARDLEY.AFF (AN) 
NE001-06436 ay 
3. Affiant believes that the Utah Jazz reserves the right to 
refuse to sell season tickets to anyone. 
4. In approximately 1989, Affiant began offering to sell 
one-third of Affiant's season tickets to Larry Clayton ("Clayton") 
on a yearly basis. 
5. Clayton accepted Affiant's offers each year for the years 
1989 through the 1994-95 season. 
6. After the 1994-95 regular season, Affiant decided not to 
offer to sell any more of Affiant's tickets to Clayton. 
7. In approximately February of 199 5, Affiant sold all of 
his interest in his Jazz tickets and any seating priorities 
attendant thereto to an unrelated third party. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this I day of Jun&, 19J 
V (.Cue) 
% KIP 'EARDLEY 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me this /y^C day of June, 1995 by KIP 
EARDLEY. 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY BUBUCv?residing at: 
7^ 
tfterfte dhiirffc 
,<p£S?\ ANDPEA NUFFER 
f&&£$'A Not-ary Public (si 1**4)-) STA f& CF UTAH 
V * y ^ > t V k / v Tcmrn Expires OCT 22. i997j 
^ S ^ ' 4^2 S /00 E *200SLCUT 84107] 
+ w + M w m •» 'P + » » + * w 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Affidavit of Kip Eardley in Case No. 950903536 was 
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the
 JrK-^6.a.v of June, 
1995, to the following: 
L. Mark Ferre, Esq. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite-3S©-5V?0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 < /17 
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NE001-06436 3 
1 C 
TITLE 25 
FRAUD 
i l P ^ l n r f i i i e n t Conveyances [Repealed]. 
B K S M e r c h a n d i s e in Bulk [Repealed}. 
£ T^iieS and Sales of Livestock [Repealed]. 
1 ffiSSting Wool [Repealed]. 
* Statute of Frauds. 
S Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16.) 
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 2 
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 3 
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
25-3-1 to 25-3-4. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
CHAPTERS 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another 
When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, grant-
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 1953 
25-5-2. Wills and implied t rusts excepted. 
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of 
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and 
testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. 1995 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 1953 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless writ ten and 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the agree-
ment; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises 
to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor or ad-
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to 
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own 
estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sea real estate for compensation; 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by 
a financial institution to lend, delay, or otherwise 
modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or 
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to 
make any other financial accommodation. 
"Credit agreement" does not include the usual 
and customary agreements related to deposit 
accounts or overdrafts'or other terms associated 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution 
which extends credit or extends a financial ac-
commodation under a credit agreement with a 
debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or 
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial 
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a 
financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means a state or 
federally chartered bank, savings and loan asso-
ciation, savings bank, industrial loan corpora-
tion, credit union, or any other institution under 
the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial 
Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial 
Institutions Act of 1981. 
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not maintain an 
action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is 
in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the 
relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the 
party against whom enforcement of the agreement 
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a signed 
application constitutes a signed agreement, if the 
creditor does not customarily obtain an additional 
1 
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signed agreement from the debtor when granting the 
application. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim 
that a credit agreement is created, unless the agree-
ment satisfies the requirements of Subsection (b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a credi-
tor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a 
debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a 
creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other busi-
ness relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly 
stated typewritten or printed provision giving notice 
to the debtor that the written agreement is a final 
expression of the agreement between the creditor and 
debtor and the written agreement may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement. The 
provision does not have to be on the promissory note 
or other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the 
credit agreement. 1989 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
lb charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of 
a third person, such representation, or some memorandum 
thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith. 1953 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
When not required to be in writing. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of 
the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the 
Promisor and need not be in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received 
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it 
pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a 
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in 
consideration of such promise. 
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into 
an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect 
to which the promise is made in terms or under circum-
stances such as to render the party making the promise 
the principal debtor and the person in whose behalf it is 
made his surety. 
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obliga-
tion of another, is made upon the consideration that the 
party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, accept-
ing the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the 
consideration that the party receiving it releases the 
property of another from a levy or his person from 
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained 
upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration 
6enefTciaif to the promisor, wnetner moving from eitner 
party to the antecedent obligation or from another person. 
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell 
merchandise and to guarantee the sale. 
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the payment 
of money upon which a third person is or may become 
liable to him transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of 
his own, or for a new consideration, and in connection 
with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such 
instrument. 1953 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be con-
tac t s in writing, and all communications sent by telegraph 
f n.d signed by the person sending the same, or by his author-
lty shall be deemed to be communications in writing. 195s 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothinjr in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific perfor-
mance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
1953 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter 
to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful 
agent of such party. 1953 
CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. 
25-6-2. 
25-6-3. 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. 
25-6-6. 
25-6-7. 
25-6-8. 
25-6-9. 
25-6-10. 
25-6-11. 
25-6-12. 
25-6-13. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Insolvency. 
Value — Transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or 
after transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before 
transfer. 
Transfer — When made. 
Remedies of creditors. 
Good faith transfer. 
Claim for relief— Time limits. 
Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Construction of chapter. 
Applicability of chapter. 
25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not 
include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid lien; 
